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O
ver the course of the recovery from the 2001 recession, many
forecasters have revised downward their expectations for job
growth in the United States. The often disappointing pace of
employment growth has been attributed to various forces, such as the
high health-care costs faced by employers, structural changes causing
some industries to decline, outsourcing of jobs from the United States to
other countries, and strong productivity growth.
1 Many of these expla-
nations imply the sluggish pace of job gains to be the result of weakness
in aggregate demand and labor demand. However, some observers have
suggested that broad demographic changes affecting labor supply—such
as the aging of the population—could account for part of the sluggish-
ness of job growth.
The labor supply explanation of disappointing job growth implies
that forecasters’ usual rule of thumb for benchmark, or trend, job growth
may now be too optimistic. The benchmark is an estimate of the number
of jobs the economy must add per month to absorb typical increases in
labor supply due to population growth and trend changes in labor force
participation. Thus, the benchmark corresponds to an estimate of trend or
sustainable employment growth. Common rule-of-thumb estimates put
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43the trend rate of increase at 150,000 jobs per month. But if demographic
changes have slowed the growth of labor supply, the trend rate of job
growth may have fallen below the historical benchmark.
A change in trend would have important implications for fiscal and
monetary policy. For fiscal policy, slower trend growth in employment
will tend to result in slower long-term growth in tax revenues, with
potentially important effects on government programs such as Social
Security. For monetary policy, assessments of the state of labor markets
and the overall economy compared to sustainable trends often figure
prominently in monetary policy decisions. If trend job growth were to
slow, actual growth in jobs that appears weak by historical standards
could exceed the new trend rate. The course of monetary policy could
differ substantially if job growth were correctly realized to be above
trend rather than incorrectly assessed to be at or below trend. Therefore,
accurate assessments of potentially changing trends are important to
effective monetary policy. 
This article examines employment and labor force indicators for
evidence of a slowing of trend employment growth in the United States.
The first section of the article analyzes historical movements in employ-
ment, population, and labor force participation for evidence of changes
in trend growth rates. The second section combines information from
available forecasts of population, labor force participation, and other
indicators to project the trend rate of employment growth over the next
ten years. The article concludes that declines in the growth rates of pop-
ulation and labor force participation have caused the trend growth rate
of employment to slow. Over the next ten years, a reasonable baseline
projection for trend job growth is 1.1 percent per year, or about
120,000 jobs per month.
I.  HISTORICAL EVIDENCE OF CHANGES IN TREND
GROWTH
To assess demographics-related changes in employment trends,
economists often rely on an identity relating employment to popula-
tion, the labor force participation rate, and the unemployment rate.
2
The identity allows changes in employment growth to be decomposed
into contributions from growth in population, labor force participation,
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and unemployment. Long-term demographic shifts can lead to signifi-
cant changes in the trend growth rates of each of these three variables
and, in turn, employment. Such demographic shifts primarily affect
employment through their impact on labor supply. However, long-term
changes in demand-side factors could also affect the trend growth rate
of employment through, for example, labor force participation and
unemployment rates.
Over the course of this article, trends will be measured in various
ways, all intended to reflect the same concept. In general, trend growth
corresponds to long-term growth—the component of growth not due to
the business cycle or temporary disturbances. Accordingly, one common
approach is to compute the trend as average growth over a long period of
time. Another common estimation approach is to use statistical tech-
niques that attempt to separate trend from cyclical movements. These
first two approaches are commonly used in historical analysis.
Another way to remove the influence of the business cycle is to esti-
mate trend growth from the so-called full employment levels of
employment, population, labor force participation, and the employ-
ment rate. Full employment is the conceptual, but not directly
observed, level of employment that would prevail if the economy were
expanding at its sustainable, trend rate, with the unemployment rate at
its sustainable or natural level and steady inflation.
3 Using full employ-
ment levels removes the influence of the business cycle on employment
and the other variables of interest. Thus, growth rates based on full
employment levels correspond to trend growth rates. The approach of
estimating trends based on full employment levels is especially useful for
projecting future trends, as the second section of the article does.
Using some of these different approaches to estimating trend
growth, this section first examines historical employment data for evi-
dence of changes in trend growth. Then, after explaining the identity
relating employment to population, labor force participation, and the
unemployment rate, the section assesses potential sources of the changes.
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Changes in trend employment growth
Simple charts of employment growth suggest the trend rate may
have slowed sometime in the early to mid-1980s (Chart 1). Employ-
ment appears to have grown at a slower rate during the past 20 or so
years than in the prior 30 years.
4 Both of the available measures of
aggregate employment, the so-called payroll measure based on a survey
of employers and the measure based on a survey of households, share
this pattern.
5 According to the payroll measure, employment grew an
average of 1.6 percent per year 1985-2005, down from 2.2 percent per
year 1955-84. Average growth in the household measure of employ-
ment slowed from 1.9 percent for 1955-84 to 1.4 percent for
1985-2005. The average growth rates of the past 20 years correspond to
current payroll employment gains of about 180,000 per month and
household employment gains of about 169,000 per month.
Although useful as basic indicators, average growth rates for 1955-
84 and 1985-2005 could yield estimates of trends that are influenced
by the business cycle.
6 Employment growth generally rises during
expansions and slows during recessions. Thus, differences in business
cycle conditions across the years of 1955, 1984, 1985, and 2005 could
affect the trend estimates. For example, in 1955 the economy was only
two years from a recession, but in 1985, the economy was still six years
from a recession. Differences in business cycle positions in 1955 and
1985 could impact trend estimates based on average growth rates for
1955-84 and 1985-2004.
One simple approach to insulating trend estimates from business
cycle influences is to define trends as growth rates from one business
cycle peak to another (Kahn). By ensuring similar economic conditions
at the beginning and end of each of the trend periods, growth rates
based solely on peak periods put trend estimates on an apples-to-apples
basis. In light of the simple evidence of a potential trend shift in the
early to mid-1980s, a natural comparison is the growth of employment
from the NBER-defined business cycle peak of 1957:Q3 to the peak of
1981:Q3 against growth from the 1981:Q3 peak to the 2001:Q1 peak
or to 2005:Q4.
7 Compared to the peak-to-peak estimate for 1981-
2001, a trend estimate based on the 1981-2005 period has the
advantage of incorporating more recent data and, therefore, perhaps of
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better reflecting current trends. But to the extent the economy today is
far from its business cycle peak and may yet experience strong employ-
ment growth, the trend estimate for 1981-2005 may slightly understate
the true trend growth rate.
Peak-to-peak growth rates of employment provide further evidence
of a slowing of trend employment growth (Chart 2).
8 By these esti-
mates, the trend growth rate of payroll employment slowed from 2.6
percent over 1957-81 to 2.0 percent over 1981-2001 and 1.8 percent
over 1981-2005. The peak-to-peak growth rate of household employ-
ment fell from 2.1 percent for 1957-81 to 1.6 percent for 1981-2001
and 1.5 percent for 1981-2005.
Another approach to insulating trend growth estimates from the
influences of the business cycle is to use statistical methods that separate
trend and cycle components. One common method, developed by
Hodrick and Prescott, allows the trend growth rate to vary gradually
over time. This analysis follows Shimer (2005) in using the Hodrick
Chart 1
EMPLOYMENT GROWTH: 



















Notes: Data are four-quarter rates of change.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and authors’ calculations48 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
and Prescott approach, with a high degree of smoothing, to estimate
labor market trends.
9 The resulting trend estimate corresponds to a
smooth curve through the history of quarterly growth rates. 
The statistical estimates of trend growth confirm a deceleration in
the trend (Charts 3 and 4).
10 For both measures of employment, trend
growth drifted up from 1955 through the early or mid-1970s and has
since drifted down. Based on the statistical estimates for payrolls, trend
growth was 1.8 percent in 1955, 2.3 percent in 1975, 2 percent in
1985, 1.6 percent in 1995, and 1.3 percent in 2005. The trend growth
rate for household employment shows a similar pattern, declining from
2 percent in 1975 to 1.3 percent in 2005.
Put together, the alternative approaches to estimating trends all indi-
cate the trend growth rate of employment has slowed. For example, all of
the estimates indicate trend growth is lower in 2005 than it was in 1975. 
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Notes: The trend growth rate is estimated with the coefficient on the trend in a regres-
sion of the log of employment (multiplied by 400) on a constant and time trend. The
sample ranges are based on NBER-determined peaks in the business cycle: 1957:Q3 to
1981:Q3, 1981:Q3 to 2001:Q1, and 1981:Q3 to 2005:Q4. 

























Notes: Actual growth rates are four-quarter rates of change. The trend is estimated with
the Hodrick and Prescott filter, using a smoothing parameter of 800,000. The trend
estimates are based on quarterly growth rates starting in 1948 and extended from 2006
through 2015 with forecasts formed from AR(4) models fit to 1984-2005 data.
Sources:  Bureau of Labor Statistics and authors’ calculations
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Notes: Actual growth rates are four-quarter rates of change. The trend is estimated with
the Hodrick and Prescott filter, using a smoothing parameter of 800,000. The trend
estimates are based on quarterly growth rates starting in 1948 and extended from 2006
through 2015 with forecasts formed from AR(4) models fit to 1984-2005 data.
Sources:  Bureau of Labor Statistics and authors’ calculations
Chart 4
TREND EMPLOYMENT GROWTH: HOUSEHOLD
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The employment identity 
The sources of the slower trend growth of employment can be
assessed with a simple identity that relates employment to population,
the labor force participation rate, and the employment rate:
employment = population x labor force participation rate x 
employment rate.
In this identity, employment is defined as the household measure,
because the other variables in the identity are measured from the house-
hold survey. The first determinant is the working-age (age 16 and
above), civilian noninstitutional population. For simplicity, the remain-
der of the article uses just the term population to refer to the
working-age population. The next determinant, the labor force partici-
pation rate, is the percentage of the population that is in the labor force,
counted as either employed or unemployed in the household survey.
Finally, the employment rate is the percentage of the labor force that is
employed, which is just 1 minus the unemployment rate. An employ-
ment rate of 95 percent, for example, corresponds to an unemployment
rate of 5 percent. The same basic identity also applies to payroll
employment, but with an additional term reflecting the share of payroll
employment in household employment. The broader household
measure includes several groups, such as self-employed workers and
farm workers, excluded from the payroll count.
The identity implies a similar relationship among the growth
rates of employment, population, labor force participation, and the
employment rate. The growth rate of household employment equals the
sum of the growth rates of population, the labor force participation
rate, and the employment rate. The growth rate of payroll employment
equals the sum of the same components, plus the growth rate of the
share of household employment accounted for by payroll employment.
All other things equal, faster population growth implies faster employ-
ment growth. Similarly, larger increases in the labor force participation
or employment rates imply faster employment growth.
Over long periods of time, the growth rates of population,
labor force participation, and the employment rate determine the trend
rate of increase in employment. Long-term changes in demographics
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can significantly influence trends in each of these determinants and, in
turn, employment. For example, a fall in the fertility rate will lower the
population growth rate, making fewer adults available for the labor
force. If more and more women opt to work outside the home, pushing
the overall labor force participation rate higher, the labor force will grow
more rapidly than the population. As a final example, a fall in the share
of young workers in the population tends to raise the employment rate,
because young workers have relatively weak attachments to the labor
force and high unemployment rates (Shimer 1998). All other things
equal, the associated rise in the employment rate boosts the pool of
workers and, in turn, employment. To some degree, long-term changes
in demand-related factors could also affect trends in variables such as
the employment rate and, in turn, employment. For example, a shift
toward temporary work that makes firms quicker to hire when demand
picks up could lower the natural rate and, in turn, permanently boost
the employment rate (Otoo).
What might account for the slowdown in trend employment growth?
Simple charts suggest the slower employment growth of the last 20
or so years can be attributed to a fall in population growth and less
rapid increases in labor force participation (Charts 5 and 6). Like
employment, the working-age population appears to have grown at a
slower rate during the past 20 years than in the prior 30 years.
11 Popula-
tion growth slowed from an average of 1.6 percent per year 1955-84 to
1.2 percent per year 1985-2005.
12 The labor force participation rate
increased much less 1985-2005 (1.2 percentage points) than 1955-84
(5.1 percentage points). Average growth in the participation rate slowed
from 0.3 percentage point in 1955-84 to 0.1 percentage point in 1985-
2005. In contrast, across the 1955-84 and 1985-2005 periods,
long-term movements in the employment rate appear to have slightly
offset the downward pressures from population and labor force partici-
pation. A decline in the employment rate slowed average employment
growth by 0.1 percentage point in 1955-84, but a rise in the employ-
ment rate raised employment growth 0.1 percentage point in
1985-2005.52 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Chart 5
POPULATION GROWTH: ACTUAL AND TREND
Chart 6

















Notes:  Actual growth rates are four-quarter rates of change. The trend is estimated with
the Hodrick and Prescott filter, using a smoothing parameter of 800,000. The trend
estimates are based on quarterly growth rates starting in 1948 and extended from 2006
through 2015 with forecasts formed from AR(4) models fit to 1984-2005 data.
Sources:  Bureau of Labor Statistics and authors’ calculations
Notes:  The employment rate is 1 less the unemployment rate. Data are quarterly averages of
monthly figures.
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But as is the case with employment, a simple comparison between
average growth rates for 1955-84 and 1985-2005 could yield estimates
of trend changes that are influenced by the business cycle. The business
cycle has been widely shown to affect the unemployment rate, as
changes in aggregate demand lead to changes in employment. The busi-
ness cycle also affects labor force participation. For example, as
recessions reduce the availability of jobs and slow growth in wages,
some workers will leave the labor force. Some are so-called “discour-
aged” workers; others may be retirees or even prime-age workers with
other sources of income.
In the case of population growth, however, the business cycle has
relatively little effect. Estimated over the past 50 years, the correlation
between GDP growth and population growth is nearly zero.
13 Despite
the absence of a measurable impact on population, the business cycle
likely has some impact on immigration, one of the components of pop-
ulation growth. Strong expansions in the United States that increase job
opportunities and wages will tend to draw more immigrants (primarily
illegal, because legal immigration is almost always near its allowed
maximum). To this point, though, cyclical fluctuations in immigration
have not been large enough to generate noticeable cyclical movements
in population. In any event, statistical methods that attempt to separate
the trend and cyclical components of population growth should accu-
rately capture the trend.
The statistical estimates of trend growth rates confirm that a falloff
in population growth and, to a lesser extent, a decline in the growth
contribution of labor force participation account for the deceleration of
employment. According to trend estimates based on business cycle
peaks, population growth slowed from 1.8 percent for 1957-81 to 1.1
percent for 1981-2001 and 1.2 percent for 1981-2005 (Table 1).
According to statistical estimates, trend growth in population drifted up
from 1.2 percent in 1955 to 1.7 percent in 1975 and down to 1.2
percent in 2005 (Chart 5). Based on either approach to trend estima-
tion, the decline in trend population growth accounts for most of the
falloff in trend employment growth. For example, in the peak-to-peak
estimates, trend population growth fell 0.6 percentage point from
1957-81 to 1981-2005, while trend growth in payrolls dropped 0.8
percentage point.
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Table 1
PEAK-TO-PEAK ESTIMATES OF TREND GROWTH IN
POPULATION, LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION, AND
THE EMPLOYMENT RATE
1957-81 1981-2001 1981-2005
Population 1.8 1.1 1.2
Labor force participation .3 .3 .2
Employment rate -.1 .2 .2
Addenda
Household employment 2.1 1.6 1.5
Payroll employment 2.6 2.0 1.8
Notes: The employment rate is defined as 1 minus the unemployment rate. Trend growth is meas-
ured as the coefficient on the trend in a regression of the log of each variable (multiplied by 400) on
a constant and time trend. The sample ranges are based on NBER-determined peaks in the business
cycle: 1957:Q3 to 1981:Q3, 1981:Q3 to 2001:Q1, and 1981:Q3 to 2005:Q4. Rounding errors
may cause the trend rate for household employment to differ slightly from the sum of trends for
population, participation, and the employment rate.
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, NBER, and authors’ calculations
A smaller portion of the falloff in trend employment growth can be
attributed to changes in labor force participation. However, the impor-
tance of participation rate movements depends in part on the trend
estimation method. According to the peak-to-peak estimates, trend
growth in labor force participation was little changed, at 0.3 percent in
1957-81 and 1981-2001 and 0.2 percent in 1981-2005 (Table 1). But
the statistical estimates show trend growth in participation rising from
0.1 percentage point in 1955 to 0.4 percentage point in 1975 and 1985
and then falling to nearly 0 in 2005 (Chart 7).
As in the simple average growth rates, the peak-to-peak and statisti-
cal estimates of trend growth rates indicate movements in the
employment rate have slightly mitigated the downward pressures from
population and labor force participation. In the peak-to-peak estimates,
trend growth in the employment rate rose from -0.1 percentage point
in 1957-81 to 0.2 percentage point in 1981-2001 and 1981-2005
(Table 1). The statistical estimates follow the same pattern, with trend
growth drifting up from -0.1 percentage point in 1955 and 1975 to 0.1
percentage point in 2005 (Chart 8).
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Chart 7
TREND GROWTH IN THE LABOR FORCE
PARTICIPATION RATE
Chart 8

























Notes: Actual growth rates are four-quarter rates of change. The trend is estimated with the
Hodrick and Prescott filter, using a smoothing parameter of 800,000. The trend estimates
are based on quarterly growth rates starting in 1948 and extended from 2006 through 2015
with forecasts formed from AR(4) models fit to 1984-2005 data.























Notes: The employment rate is 1 less the unemployment rate. Actual growth rates are four-
quarter rates of change. The trend is estimated with the Hodrick and Prescott filter, using a
smoothing parameter of 800,000. The trend estimates are based on quarterly growth rates
starting in 1948 and extended from 2006 through 2015 with forecasts formed from AR(4)
models fit to 1984-2005 data.
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and authors’ calculations
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What has caused population and labor force participation to decelerate?
The deceleration of population and labor force participation that
underlie the slowing of trend employment growth reflect various demo-
graphic and socioeconomic changes.
14 The falloff in population growth
stems chiefly from fluctuations in fertility associated with the baby
boom. The fertility rate soared during the baby boom (1946-64), sub-
sequently causing growth in the working-age population to surge. More
recently, a lower fertility rate (the so-called “baby bust”) has restrained
growth in the working-age population. The downward pressures on
population growth associated with the reduction in the fertility rate
have dominated the effects of changes in mortality and immigration,
the other two determinants of population change. Reflecting factors
such as advances in medical technology, mortality rates have steadily
declined over time. Thus, declining mortality has boosted population
growth but played little role in changes in population growth over the
postwar period. As detailed in the appendix, rising immigration (reflect-
ing factors such as an increased willingness of the United States to allow
immigration and the greater desirability of jobs in this country) has also
been an important source of population growth.
The slowing of growth in the labor force participation rate can be
attributed primarily to a deceleration in the participation rate of
women. Over the last several decades, a number of factors have led
women to devote more time to paid work (Bradbury and Katz;
Hotchkiss 2005). These factors include increased education, rising
wages, changes in household structures and technologies, and legal and
social movements promoting equal opportunities in the workplace.
Accordingly, the participation rate of women has risen dramatically,
from 35.6 percent in 1955 to 59.2 percent in 2005. However, over
time, the pace of increase in women’s participation has slowed (Chart
9). The participation rate of women increased much more from 1955
to 1981 (from 35.6 percent to 52.1 percent) than it did from 1981 to
2005 (from 52.1 percent to 59.2 percent). Although many have specu-
lated that the deceleration of the participation rate of women is tied to
factors such as the incomes of spouses and more women deciding to
stay home with children, the deceleration has proved hard to explain
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drifted down at a steady rate over the past five decades (Chart 9),
reflecting such factors as an upward trend in early retirement (Costa;
CBO 2004). As a result, the slowing of growth in the participation rate
of women associated with many different demographic and socioeco-
nomic factors largely accounts for the deceleration of overall labor force
participation.
II.  FORECASTING THE TREND GROWTH RATE FOR
2005 TO 2015
Just as demographic and socioeconomic changes have slowed the
trend growth rate of employment sometime in the past 20 to 30 years,
they might also restrain trend growth in the years ahead. Indeed, fore-
casts from sources such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics (Su), Council
of Economic Advisers, and Macroeconomic Advisers put average
payroll growth over the next 5-10 years at between 1.0 and 1.3
Chart 9
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES OF MEN AND
WOMEN
Notes: Data are quarterly averages of monthly figures.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and authors’ calculations58 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
percent.
15 By comparison, this article’s estimates of trend growth over
the past 20 or so years range from 1.3 to 2.0 percent, depending on the
measure and time period.
By themselves, the few available forecasts of employment growth
over the next decade raise a number of questions. First, is the projected
slowing of average or trend employment growth a reasonable forecast?
Second, as good as any single prediction may be, is it possible to
develop a forecast that may be more accurate? Many studies have shown
averages of forecasts to generally be more accurate than any single fore-
cast (Clemen; Timmermann). Accordingly, a forecast that combines
information from a range of available forecasts may be more accurate
than any of the individual forecasts of trend employment growth.
Finally, any forecast is subject to considerable uncertainty. The true rate
of trend growth may be well above or below the forecast. In light of the
inherent uncertainty, what is a reasonable confidence interval for the
forecast of trend employment growth?
This section analyzes and combines information from various fore-
casts of population, labor force participation, and the employment rate
to develop a forecast of the growth trend of employment for 2005 to
2015. The forecast includes a point estimate and an approximate 70
percent confidence interval. According to this analysis, slower popula-
tion growth and, to a lesser extent, declining labor force participation
are likely to pull trend employment growth down from the prevailing
level of the last 20-30 years. Over the next ten years, a reasonable base-
line projection for annual payroll job growth is 1.1 percent, or about
120,000 jobs per month. The estimated forecast confidence interval for
trend (payroll) employment growth is 0.8 to 1.3 percent, or 85,000 to
150,000 jobs per month.
The section begins with an explanation of the methodology used
to forecast trend growth and proceeds with estimation of trends in
population, labor force participation, and the employment rate. The
estimated trends in these variables are then combined to derive a
forecast of trend employment growth. The section concludes with a
discussion of policy implications.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2006 59
Trend forecast methodology
One approach to forecasting trend employment growth from 2005
to 2015 would be to project employment directly. Such an approach,
however, would ignore much of the currently available information on
demographic forces that are likely to affect growth in the labor force
over the next decade. For example, the current age structure of the pop-
ulation implies important changes in labor force participation over the
next 10 years. A more accurate forecast of trend employment growth
can probably be obtained by first forecasting population, labor force
participation, and the employment rate, and then adding up their
growth rates, using the identity described in the last section. Thus, this
section relies on the forecast-by-component approach.
Developing accurate projections of trend growth of employment
and its determinants requires some care in separating trend and cycli-
cal influences. To isolate trends in labor force participation and the
employment rate, the following analysis develops forecasts of growth
in the full employment levels of each variable.
16 As noted in the first
section, full employment levels remove the influences of the business
cycle. Thus, conceptually, growth rates based on full employment
levels correspond to long-term growth rates that average out the
effects of the business cycle. The distinction between actual and full
employment levels is especially important for the 2005 levels of the
labor force participation and employment rates. At this point in the
recovery from the 2001 recession, it is not clear whether the partici-
pation and employment rates are at or below trend (the analysis
elaborates). Looking ahead to 2015, however, forecasts of the partici-
pation and employment rates generally represent full employment
rates. Because business cycle influences are very difficult to project 10
years into the future, long-term forecasts usually correspond to esti-
mates of trend or full employment levels. In the case of population
growth, because the influences of the business cycle are small, fore-
casts of trend growth in population can be based on just forecasts of
actual growth.
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For each variable, point forecasts and confidence intervals are devel-
oped by combining information from various sources, including recent
trends and forecasts from sources such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(Toosi, hereafter referred to as the BLS forecast), Congressional Budget
Office (2006, and unpublished detail provided by the CBO), Report of
the Trustees of the Social Security Administration (U.S. Social Security
Administration, hereafter referred to as SSA Trustees Report), and
Macroeconomic Advisers. In all cases, the point forecast is estimated as
an average of the available forecasts.
Calculating confidence intervals for the growth forecasts of employ-
ment and most of its determinants involves some significant
complications. In the cases of labor force participation and the employ-
ment rate, the available forecasts are for the 2005 and 2015 levels of
these variables, rather than the growth rates from 2005 to 2015. As a
result, it is most natural to specify confidence intervals for the 2005 and
2015 levels, and then derive the implied confidence intervals for the
growth rates. However, the statistically appropriate confidence interval
around the growth rate forecast is a complex function of the intervals
around the 2005 and 2015 levels. Moreover, in the case of the partici-
pation rate, the confidence intervals are asymmetric—that is, not
centered at the point estimate (for reasons made clear below). Finally,
the appropriate confidence interval for the trend employment growth
forecast is a complex function of the intervals for growth in population,
labor force participation, and the employment rate.
17
The statistical simulation method of Lebow and Rudd provides a
simple way of estimating confidence intervals that appropriately
account for these complications. The simulation method is used to esti-
mate the confidence intervals for trend growth in the labor force
participation rate and the employment rate from underlying intervals
around projections of the participation and employment rates in 2005
and 2015. In the case of population, however, the confidence interval is
formulated directly, without simulation, because the available forecasts
are for population growth rather than population levels. Finally, statisti-
cal simulation is used to estimate the confidence interval for the trend
employment growth forecast as a function of the intervals for the com-
ponents of employment growth.
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The intervals, largely subjective, are intended to approximate 70
percent confidence intervals. In most cases, the confidence intervals are
broadly consistent with 70 percent intervals implied by historical errors
in the available long-term forecasts and select other statistical evidence
of forecast uncertainty (for each variable, detail is provided below in
footnotes). In particular, over the past 30 years, the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) has regularly published 10-year ahead forecasts of pop-
ulation growth and labor force participation. The BLS has also regularly
published evaluations of the forecasts’ accuracy. The size of such histor-
ical forecast errors provides some guidance on the likely uncertainty in
forecasts for 2005-15. Nonetheless, as is the case in the Lebow and
Rudd and Shapiro and Wilcox studies of bias in CPI inflation, the
intervals reflect a significant amount of judgment.
Forecasts of population, labor force participation, and the
employment rate
Using the methodology described above, this section develops base-
line forecasts and confidence intervals for the 2005-15 trend growth
rates of population, labor force participation, and the employment rate. 
Population growth. Over the next ten years, the size of the working-
age population will be determined by three factors:  the current (2005)
population size, mortality, and immigration.
18 Fertility will affect the
total population size but not the size of the working-age population. Of
these factors, the current population size is known. The mortality rate
can be forecast reasonably accurately, in part because of its stability over
periods such as a decade (Mulder). Immigration is the largest source of
variability in population growth over a decade and, in turn, the largest
source of forecast uncertainty (Fullerton 2003; Mulder).
Various factors (detailed in the appendix) contribute to making
immigration difficult to forecast. Unpredictable changes in immigration
law can significantly affect immigration. Congress is currently consider-
ing alternative proposals for reforming immigration law. However, the
diversity of views toward immigration in the United States makes pre-
dicting the timing and form of any reforms difficult. Illegal
immigration, an important component of total immigration, further
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complicates forecasting total immigration. Illegal immigration depends
on hard-to-predict variables such as economic and social conditions in
other countries and the effectiveness of the enforcement efforts of the
Department of Homeland Security. Finally, imprecision in annual esti-
mates of immigration (especially illegal) makes it difficult to accurately
assess recent trends and the implications for future immigration.
19
Reflecting these difficulties, some of the projections of immigration
over the next 10 years differ considerably.
20 In the most recent Census
Bureau population projections (U.S. Census Bureau 2004), immigra-
tion is assumed to average about 800,000 persons per year from 2005
to 2015.
21 In contrast, the recommendations of a panel of technical
advisors to the Social Security Administration imply annual average
immigration of about 1.3 million persons per year over the next decade
(Technical Panel on Assumptions and Methods, hereafter referred to as
SSA Technical Panel). These very different projections reflect alternative
interpretations of the late 1990s surge in immigration, to a level of at
least 1.3 million per year. The Census Bureau attributes the high immi-
gration of the late 1990s to transitory effects of the Immigration and
Reform Control Act of 1986.
22 The SSA Technical Panel attributes more
of the late 1990s rise in immigration to permanent factors. The baseline
projection in the SSA Trustees Report takes a middle ground, putting
average annual immigration from 2005 to 2015 at about 1 million.
23
But because the reported forecasts of population reflect relatively
modest differences in immigration assumptions, the forecasts are very
similar. In fact, the available forecasts of population growth over the
next ten years are all identical, at 1.0 percent per year (Table 2).
24 For
example, both the Census Bureau (U.S. Census Bureau 2004) and SSA
Trustees Report put average population growth at 1.0 percent, even
though the SSA Trustees Report projection assumes 200,000 more
immigrants per year than does the Census Bureau. Incorporating the
even stronger immigration projection of the SSA Technical Advisers
implies stronger population growth, roughly 1.1 percent per year.
For the purposes of forecasting trend employment growth, this
article takes the consensus or average population growth rate of 1.0
percent as the baseline trend estimate. The trend forecast confidence
interval is estimated by combining alternative immigration assumptions
from the Census Bureau, SSA Trustees Report, and SSA Technical Panel
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Table 2
AVAILABLE FORECASTS OF POPULATION GROWTH,
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION, AND THE
EMPLOYMENT RATE
Average  Labor force Labor force Unemployment  Unemployment
population  participation rate participation rate rate (trend or  rate (trend or
growth,  (trend or full (trend or full natural), 2005 natural), 2015
2005-15 employment), employment), 
2005 2015
CBO 1.0 66.5 65.4 5.2 5.2
BLS
(a) 1.0 66.0 65.6 5.4 5.0
SSA 
Trustees 

























(f) 1.0 66.3 65.5 5.2 5.2
Notes: (a) For BLS and Macroeconomic Advisers, the forecasts use 2014 instead of 2015. (b) The
statistical trends are estimates based on the Hodrick and Prescott filter, with a smoothing parameter
of 51,200 (a setting in line with the one used by Orphanides and Williams to estimate trend unem-
ployment). The trend estimates are based on a data sample starting in 1948 and extended from
2006 through 2015 with forecasts formed from AR(4) models fit to 1984-2005 data. (c) The Him-
melberg and McConnell estimate is for 2004 rather than 2005. (d) The natural rate figure for Blue
Chip is a consensus forecast of the average unemployment rate for 2012-2016. (e) The natural rate
figure for the CEA is a forecast of the unemployment rate in 2011. (f) The average is a simple aver-
age of the available forecasts.
Sources: Congressional Budget Office (2006, and unpublished detail provided by the CBO), Toosi
and Su (BLS figures), U.S. Social Security Administration, Macroeconomic Advisers, Himmelberg
and McConnell, U.S. Census Bureau (2004), United Nations, Blue Chip Economic Indicators,
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with baseline immigration and population numbers from CBO. The
CBO forecast is based on the SSA Trustees Report projection, updated
to reflect newly available population data for 2005. Accordingly, the
CBO’s population forecast incorporates the SSA’s middle-ground
assumption on immigration, of about 1 million persons per year. In cal-
culating the population growth confidence interval, a reasonable range
for immigration is taken to be 800,000 to 1.4 million per year.
25 The
lower bound of 800,000 corresponds to the immigration assumption of
the Census Bureau. The upper bound of 1.4 million draws on the
immigration recommendation of the SSA Technical Panel and the high-
immigration scenario considered in the SSA Trustees Report.
26 This
range of immigration assumptions implies a population growth forecast
range of 0.9 to 1.1 percent per year (Table 3).
27
Labor force participation. Most analyses of the labor force participa-
tion rate (LFPR) focus on the rates of particular demographic groups,
such as men and women of age 25 to 54. The overall participation rate
equals a population-weighted average of the participation rates of
demographic groups (the weight on each group’s participation rate is
the group’s share in the population). Consequently, changes in the
overall participation rate over time can be decomposed into two com-
ponents, one reflecting changes in the population weights of
demographic groups and the other reflecting changes in the participa-
tion rates of demographic groups:
28
change in overall LFPR = Σ (group i’s initial LFPR) x (change in 
group i’s population share)
+ Σ (group i’s end period population share) x 
(change in group i’s LFPR). 
Over a ten-year horizon, difficulties in forecasting changes in the
participation rates of key demographic groups create the largest uncer-
tainties in forecasts of the overall participation rate.
29 Although
participation rates for some important groups have followed clear his-
torical trends, rates for others have not. For example, the participation
rate of prime-age (ages 25 to 54) men has trended down steadily over
the postwar period. In contrast, the participation rate of men of age 55
group i
group i
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Table 3
POINT FORECASTS AND RANGES FOR 2005-15 TREND
EMPLOYMENT GROWTH AND ITS DETERMINANTS
Point forecast Forecast confidence interval
(percent) (percent)
Population growth 1.0 .9 to 1.1
Labor force participation rate 
(trend or full employment), 2005 66.3 66.0 to 67.3
Labor force participation rate 
(trend or full employment), 2015 65.5 64.3 to 66.7
Growth in participation rate -.2 -.3 to .0
Unemployment rate 
(trend or natural), 2005 5.2 4.7 to 5.7
Unemployment rate 
(trend or natural), 2015  5.2 4.4 to 6.0
Growth in employment rate .0 -.1 to .1
Differential between household 
and payroll growth .3 .0 to .4
Growth in household employment .8 .6 to 1.0
Growth in payroll employment 1.1 .8 to 1.3
Note: The growth rates in the table correspond to average annual percent changes.
Sources: Congressional Budget Office (2006, and unpublished detail provided by the CBO), Toosi
and Su (BLS figures), U.S. Social Security Administration, Macroeconomic Advisers, Himmelberg
and McConnell, U.S. Census Bureau (2004), United Nations, Blue Chip Economic Indicators,
Council of Economic Advisers, Survey of Professional Forecasters, and authors’ calculations
and above declined steadily until 1985, but has since trended upward
(Johnson; Quinn). Even for some demographic groups with clear his-
torical trends in participation, it is difficult to distinguish trend and
business cycle contributions in recent declines of participation (Fergu-
son). Some observers have suggested the level of labor force
participation in 2005 is at about trend, or the full employment level,
while others argue current participation is well below the full employ-
ment level because of a cyclically soft demand for labor. The trend-cycle66 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
decomposition problem is especially acute for the participation rate of
women, in light of the deceleration of women’s participation over the
last 20 or so years (Bradbury).
In contrast, changes in population weights are a relatively small
source of uncertainty in forecasts of changes in the overall labor force
participation rate. Current population shares are of course known.
Looking ahead to 2015, immigration makes the population level diffi-
cult to forecast, but immigration has more effect on the overall
population level than on population shares.
30 As a result, the population
shares of demographic groups in 2015, and the changes in shares from
2005 to 2015, can be predicted with some precision. Over the next ten
years, the population shares of prime-age men and women will fall,
while the shares of men and women age 55 and above will rise. Because
the participation rates of older men and women are lower than their
prime-age counterparts, the population aging will tend to push down
the overall participation rate. For example, if the participation rates of
male and female workers in the age groups of 16-24, 25-54, and 55 and
up remained at their 2005 levels, the overall participation rate would
fall about 1.7 percentage points from 2005 to 2015.
31
The available forecasts of the full employment rates of overall labor
force participation in 2005 and 2015 are generally similar (Table 2). For
2005, the BLS estimates the full employment rate of labor force partic-
ipation to be 66.0 percent. The CBO estimates the full employment
rate of participation to be 66.5 percent.
32 For 2015, the CBO projects
that, under current tax rates, the full employment participation rate will
fall to 65.4 percent.
33 The BLS predicts an overall participation rate of
65.6 percent in 2014. 
The similarities in overall participation rates mask some sizable, but
offsetting, differences in projections for the participation rates of demo-
graphic groups. For example, in the case of the 2015 participation rate
of women of age 55-64, the CBO projection (about 57.8 percent) con-
siderably exceeds the SSA Trustee Report forecast (52.8 percent). But
for men of age 16-24, the SSA’s projected participation rate (roughly 68
percent) is higher than the CBO’s (65.6 percent).
The baseline estimates of full employment participation in 2005
and 2015 are simple averages of the available estimates in each year:
66.3 percent in 2005 and 65.5 percent in 2015 (Table 2).
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Confidence intervals for the 2005 and 2015 forecasts of full
employment participation are based on recent movements in participa-
tion rates and various scenarios for participation rates implied by the
analysis of sources such as Bradbury, CBO, and SSA Trustees Report.
For 2005, some have suggested the full employment rate of labor force
participation to be as high as it was prior to the 2001 recession—as
high as 67.3 percent, the peak rate of participation reached in 2000.
Alternatively, according to BLS estimates and other less formal assess-
ments, the full employment rate of participation could be 66.0 percent,
the actual rate for the year. 
Confidence intervals for full employment participation in 2015
combine the intervals for 2005 participation with different estimates of
the effects of population aging on participation. As noted above, a
rough estimate (obtained by assuming the participation rates of major
demographic groups remain at their 2005 levels) of the population
aging effect is 1.7 percent. An upper bound for the 2015 participation
rate is obtained by subtracting a very conservative population-aging
effect of 0.6 percentage point (roughly one-third of the baseline esti-
mate) from the 2005 upper bound of 67.3 percent. The resulting upper
bound of 66.7 percent could prove accurate if, for example, the partici-
pation rate of workers aged 16-24 moved toward its levels of 2000 and
the participation rate of prime-age women resumed an upward trajec-
tory. The lower bound of 64.3 percent is obtained by taking the full
employment level in 2005 to be equal to the actual rate of 66.0 percent
and subtracting the baseline population-aging contribution of 1.7 per-
centage points.
35 Reflecting the greater uncertainty in forecasts for 2015
compared to estimates for 2005, the forecast range for full employment
participation in 2015 is wider than the range for 2005.
These full employment levels yield a baseline estimate of trend
growth in participation equal to -0.2 percent per year, with an approxi-
mate confidence interval of -0.3 to 0.0 percent (Table 3). The
confidence interval for the growth rate, calculated with the statistical
methods of Lebow and Rudd, reflects the confidence intervals around
the forecasts of the participation rate levels in 2005 and 2015.
36 The
growth rate range is asymmetric:  The gap between the upper end of the
range and the baseline estimate is larger than the gap between the lower
end and the baseline. The asymmetry in the growth rate interval reflects
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asymmetries in the confidence intervals for the trend participation rate
estimates for 2005 and 2015. The growth rate interval’s upper bound of
0 percent implies that, although there is some chance of an increase in
the trend rate of participation, the chances are not high.
Employment rate. The natural or full employment rate of unem-
ployment is affected by a wide array of factors. As noted in the first
section, demographics are key determinants of the natural rate. The
structural factors that determine how long workers take to find jobs also
affect the natural rate. For instance, long-term changes in the economy
that destroy jobs in old industries and create jobs in new ones can
produce mismatches between the skills workers have and the skills
needed for the new jobs. The mismatches can extend the time required
for workers losing old jobs to find new ones, raising the natural unem-
ployment rate. Similarly, a higher level of unemployment benefits will
lead some workers to be more selective about job offers, extending their
unemployment spell and thereby increasing the overall unemployment
rate. Finally, structural forces that affect the willingness of firms to hire
can also impact the natural rate. For instance, increased availability of
temporary workers may make firms quicker to hire in response to a
pickup in demand, lowering the natural rate of unemployment (Otoo).
Estimates of the natural rate are widely known to be imprecise
(Staiger, Stock, and Watson; Orphanides and Williams). Estimates are
inherently imprecise in part because the true natural rate can never be
observed. In addition, many of the likely determinants of the natural
rate are difficult to quantify, making it hard to estimate their contribu-
tions to the natural rate. Even for determinants that can be measured,
their relationships to the natural rate may not be precisely estimated.
Nonetheless, most available estimates of the natural rate of unem-
ployment are similar (Table 2). For example, CBO estimates the natural
rate to be 5.2 percent, at present and in 2015. Macroeconomic Advisers
puts the natural rate at 5.3 percent from 2005 through 2014. The BLS
projects a natural rate of 5.4 percent in 2004 and 5.0 percent in 2014
(U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2005(a)). The SSA Trustees Report
assumes an unemployment rate of 5.5 percent in 2015, implying a
natural rate of the same value. 
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The baseline estimates of the natural rate of unemployment in
2005 and 2015 are simple averages of the available estimates in each
year:  5.2 percent in 2005 and 2015 (Table 2).
Confidence intervals for the 2005 and 2015 forecasts of the natural
rate are drawn from historical fluctuations in estimates of the natural
rate and recent fluctuations in actual unemployment. Although most
estimates of the natural rate are now close to 5.2 percent, in the recent
past, conventional estimates of the natural rate were sometimes higher.
For example, in the early 1990s, the natural rate was commonly esti-
mated to be about 6 percent (Weiner). More recently, though, actual
unemployment has dipped well below 5 percent. During the last expan-
sion, in which unemployment surprisingly dipped below 4 percent,
some observers suggested the natural rate could be less than 5 percent.
In light of such evidence, the confidence interval for the 2005 estimate
of the natural rate is set at 4.7 to 5.7 percent.
37 The interval for 2015
should be somewhat wider, to reflect the greater uncertainty in long-
term forecasts. The 2015 forecast interval is set at 4.4 to 6.0 percent.
38 
The baseline estimate and ranges for the natural rate in 2005 and
2015 yield a baseline estimate of trend growth in the employment rate
(recall that the employment rate is 1 less the unemployment rate) equal
to 0 percent per year. The forecast confidence interval (statistically sim-
ulated) is -0.1 to 0.1 percent (Table 3).
39 The range implies that,
although long-term changes in the employment rate could add to or
subtract from trend employment growth, the impact should be small.
A forecast of trend growth in employment
The projected rates of trend growth in population, labor force par-
ticipation, and the employment rate can be combined to estimate the
trend growth rate of employment from 2005 to 2015. The baseline esti-
mate of trend growth in the household measure of employment is just
the sum of the baseline trends of growth in population (1.0 percent),
labor force participation (-0.2 percent), and the employment rate (0
percent): 0.8 percent per year (Table 3). The approximate 70 percent
confidence interval for the household employment growth forecast is a
 70 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
statistically simulated function of the confidence intervals for the fore-
casts of growth in population, participation, and the employment rate.
The estimated confidence interval is 0.6 to 1.0 percent per year.
Forecasting the trend growth rate of payroll employment involves
combining the projection of household employment with a projected
differential between trend growth in household and payroll employ-
ment. As noted in the article’s first section, growth in payrolls has often
exceeded growth in household employment. The available forecasts that
include both household and payroll employment continue the pattern.
In BLS forecasts for 2004 to 2014, annual growth in payrolls outstrips
growth in the household measure by 0.3 percentage point (Su). In the
Macroeconomic Advisers forecast for 2005 to 2014, payroll growth
exceeds household growth by about 
1⁄4 percentage point per year. The
first section’s estimates of recent statistical trends put the differential
between 0 (the smooth trend estimates for 2005) and 0.3 percentage
point (the peak-peak estimates for 1981-2001). At times in the past,
however, the differential in trend estimates has been 0.5 percent or
larger. In light of this evidence, the point estimate of the differential
between trend growth in household and payroll employment is set at
0.3 percentage point (an average of the differentials in the BLS and
Macroeconomic Adviser forecasts), with a confidence interval of 0 to
0.4 percentage point.
Combining the projected household-payroll differential with the
forecast for household employment yields a baseline estimate of 2005-
15 trend growth in payrolls equal to 1.1 percent. The approximate 70
percent confidence interval (statistically simulated) for the trend fore-
cast is 0.8 to 1.3 percent.
40 At the current size of payrolls, trend growth
of 1.1 percent corresponds to average monthly job gains of about
120,000. The 0.8 to 1.3 percent range for trend growth in payrolls cor-
responds to average monthly job gains between 85,000 and 150,000.
The baseline estimate implies the common, benchmark, rule of thumb
for job gains—150,000 jobs per month—is too high. The rule of
thumb falls at the top end of a reasonable range of estimates of trend
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Policy implications
The slower trend growth of employment over the next decade has a
range of important implications for fiscal and monetary policy.
Without an offsetting change in productivity growth, slower trend
growth in employment implies slower long-run growth of GDP and
aggregate income. The trend deceleration of employment and income
will likely reduce growth in tax revenues. Slower growth in tax revenues
could create difficulties in funding some government programs. For
example, many economists have projected that the demographic factors
likely to slow trend employment growth in the years ahead will eventu-
ally have dramatic effects on the financial health of the Medicare and
Social Security systems.
In the case of monetary policy, the Federal Reserve Open Market
Committee has made clear that assessments of the state of labor markets
and the overall economy compared to sustainable trends play an impor-
tant role in policy decisions. As a result, accurate estimates of trends are
crucial to effective monetary policy. If trend job growth were overesti-
mated, actual growth in jobs thought to be below trend could in fact
exceed trend. In turn, operating with an overestimate of trend growth,
policymakers might ease policy when, given the true rate of trend
growth, they should hold policy steady or tighten. Extended over a
period of time, the stimulative monetary policy associated with such a
mistake could cause inflation to rise above its desired level. Along these
lines, some economists have suggested that the broad failure of econo-
mists to detect the trend productivity slowdown of the early 1970s and
the associated slowdown in trend GDP growth can explain much of the
rise in inflation over the 1970s (Orphanides). Fortunately, however, in
current circumstances, policymakers are well aware of the likelihood of a
slowing of trend growth in employment. Forecasts from such sources as
the BLS, CBO, and Council of Economic Advisers all anticipate slower
average employment growth in the years ahead than in the years past.
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III. CONCLUSION
Although some of the sluggish pace of job gains following the 2001
recession is likely due to demand-side forces, long-term changes in
demographics and socioeconomic factors have likely slowed the trend
growth rate of employment. Most importantly, long-term population
growth has fallen, as declining fertility has dominated increasing immi-
gration. Various factors have caused a deceleration in labor force
participation that has modestly detracted from trend growth in the
workforce. These forces slowed the trend growth rate of employment
over the past 20 or so years compared to the prior 30 years. Looking
ahead, they can be expected to cause the trend growth rate of the next
10 years to edge down further. This article estimates the trend growth
rate of payroll employment from 2005 to 2015 at 1.1 percent per year,
or about 120,000 jobs per month. By comparison, common rule-of-
thumb estimates put the trend rate of increase at 150,000 jobs per
month. Of course, forecasts of trends are very uncertain. An approxi-
mate 70 percent confidence interval around the baseline estimate of
trend growth implies monthly job gains between 85,000 and 150,000
jobs per month. So although the point estimate implies the historical
rule of thumb to be too high, a reasonable confidence interval includes
the common benchmark.
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APPENDIX
This appendix details the rising importance of immigration in pop-
ulation growth and the sources of difficulties in forecasting immigration.
Immigration’s contribution to population growth
Over time, immigration has accounted for an increasingly large
share of total population growth. Using data from decennial cen-
suses, Table 4 shows the growth of total population, the growth in
the foreign-born population, and the estimated contribution of
immigration, based on the foreign-born population.
41 From 1970 to
1980, immigration contributed approximately 2.1 percentage points
to the total population growth of 11.4 percent. From 1990 to 2000,
immigration contributed 4.5 percentage points to the total popula-
tion growth of 13.0 percent. As a result, the change in the
foreign-born population has accounted for a larger share of the
change in the total population (Chart 10). During the 1990s, the
change in foreign-born population accounted for more than 
1⁄3 of the
change in total population, compared to only 
1⁄5 to 
1⁄4 of the change in
total population in the 1970s and 1980s.
Census Bureau estimates of the components of population change
since 2000 suggest immigration’s importance has continued to increase
this decade. According to the latest estimate, published in December
2005, immigration accounted for more than 40 percent of  population
growth from April 2000 to July 2005 (U.S. Census Bureau 2005).
However, there is some disagreement among demographers as to
whether immigration’s importance has in fact risen further this decade.
Difficulties in forecasting immigration 
Three factors make immigration difficult to forecast accurately.
The first two, the most important, are the unpredictability of changes
in immigration law and unpredictability of illegal immigration. The
third is the imprecision of annual immigration data.
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Table 4
ESTIMATES OF THE HISTORICAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF
IMMIGRATION TO TOTAL POPULATION GROWTH
Percent change  Percent change in Approximate contribution
in total population foreign-born population of immigration 
to population growth
(percentage points)
1970-80 11.4 44.6 2.1
1980-90 9.9 40.4 2.4
1990-2000 13.0 57.4 4.5
Note:  The approximate contribution of immigration to population growth is estimated as the
change in the foreign-born population divided by the base year total population level.
Sources: Census Bureau figures reported in the 2002 U.S. Statistical Abstract and authors’ calculations
Chart 10
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Immigration law. The laws governing immigration are subject to
important, difficult-to-predict changes. For example, the numerical
caps on admission of legal immigrants have changed many times in the
past. As the U.S. economy boomed in the late 1990s, the caps on tem-
porary workers (workers on H1-B visas) were temporarily raised to
much higher levels. Such changes are difficult to predict far in advance.
At present, Congress is considering reform proposals that could signifi-
cantly affect future immigration. However, as noted in the article’s text,
the outcomes of the reform discussions cannot be reliably predicted.
Illegal immigration. Illegal immigration is a large part of total immi-
gration.
42 Conventional estimates put annual illegal immigration during
the 1990s between 350,000 to 550,000 persons per year, or about 30 to
40 percent of total immigration (Costanzo and others; Warren). Some
studies estimate that, since 2000, the share of illegal immigration in
total immigration has been even higher, at 50 percent or more (Passel;
Passel and Suro).
The considerable unpredictability of illegal immigration makes
total immigration difficult to forecast. As noted in the text, illegal
immigration depends on hard-to-predict variables such as economic
and social conditions in other countries and the effectiveness of the
enforcement efforts of the Department of Homeland Security. 
Imprecision in annual data. Problems with the reliability of annual
data make assessing immigration trends and accurately projecting future
immigration difficult (Mulder and others). Changes in the foreign-born
population can be decomposed into three components:  legal immi-
grants (so-called “green card” holders), illegal immigrants, and legal
nonimmigrants (students and workers allowed to live in the United
States temporarily).
43 Estimating the net flow of legal immigrants is
complicated because some new legal immigrants become legal immi-
grants by adjusting their status from legal nonimmigrants. Many of
those obtaining legal permanent residence have already lived in the
United States for a long time. There is of course no official record-
keeping on the entry and exit of illegal immigrants. Finally, legal
changes make projecting the net flow of legal nonimmigrants difficult.
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ENDNOTES
1The initial weakness of job growth led many to describe much of the recov-
ery as “jobless.”  Schreft and Singh review demand-related explanations for the
“jobless” recoveries that followed the 1990-91 and 2001 recessions.
2Perry is a seminal reference on using such an approach to estimate trend
employment growth.
3At a moment in time, it is possible that the pace of economic growth could
be above or below trend, while the level of activity at that moment in time is at its
full employment level. In a steady state equilibrium, however, full employment
would be accompanied by trend growth. 
4Although the data are suggestive of a shift in average growth, formal statisti-
cal tests (the tests of Andrews and Bai and Perron) fail to identify a statistically
significant break. However, in limited data samples, such tests are known to
sometimes have difficulty in correctly identifying whether breaks have occurred.
5The modestly lower average growth of household employment compared to
payrolls reflects some of the important conceptual differences between the meas-
ures. For example, the measures differ importantly in their definitions of employ-
ment (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2005(b)). The payroll survey counts jobs;
the household survey counts workers. As a result, for an individual holding two
jobs, the payroll survey records two positions, while the household survey records
just one. Factors such as an upward trend in multiple job holding would con-
tribute to faster growth in payrolls than household employment. The payroll
measure is generally considered to be a more reliable indicator of employment,
because it is based on a larger survey.
6Assessing changes in trends from simple charts is further complicated by the
clear reduction in the volatility of employment growth that began around 1984 –
a change in volatility associated with the “great moderation” documented by
(among others) Blanchard and Simon, Kim and Nelson, McConnell and Perez-
Quiros, and Stock and Watson (2002). In Chart 1, what appears to be a reduc-
tion in trend growth in the early to mid-1980s might be more reflective of a fall
in the cyclical volatility of growth than a true decline in trend growth.
7Using a peak date of 1980:Q1 yields results very similar to the reported
results based on the 1981:Q3 peak.
8The peak-to-peak growth rates are estimated by regressing log employment
on a constant and time trend. The time trend estimate is generally thought to be
more efficient than a simple average growth rate. Filardo applies the same
approach to estimating trend growth in productivity.
9Estimates from alternative statistical models of trends are qualitatively simi-
lar to those reported from the Hodrick and Prescott (with high smoothing)
approach. In particular, trend estimates based on the Rotemberg approach are
very similar to those reported. Trend estimates based on an autoregressive model
with time-varying intercept are also qualitatively similar, if the amount of time
variation in the intercept is fixed at the level estimated for the labor force. How-
ever, if the amount of time variation in the intercept is estimated by maximum
likelihood or the method of Stock and Watson (1998), the resulting trend esti-
mate shows very little change over time.
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10In line with the suggestions of Perron and Wada and Shimer (2005), the
smoothing parameter of the Hodrick-Prescott filter is set very high, to 800,000.
In light of the difficulty of accurately estimating trends at the beginning of sam-
ples, the trend estimates are based on raw data starting in 1948. Following the
Mise, Kim, and Newbold methodology for reducing potential imprecision in the
end-of-sample estimates, the data samples from which the trends are estimated
are padded with forecasts of employment growth for 2006-2015. The forecasts
are formed from AR(4) models fit to data from 1984 to 2005. Using AR models
fit to 1948-2005 data yields qualitatively similar results. Nonetheless, the uncer-
tainty around estimates of trends at the end of a data remains considerable.
11The periodic spikes in the population growth rate reflect revisions to popu-
lation levels that sometimes follow decennial censuses. When such revisions
occur, past data are not revised to reflect the new higher levels of population.
Trend estimates based on a population series that smoothes out these population
adjustments are very similar to those reported.
12Applying the Bai and Perron tests for structural breaks identifies two signif-
icant changes in average population growth, in 1968 and 1980. 
13In particular, in 1955-2005 data, the correlation between GDP and popu-
lation growth (four-quarter rates) is essentially zero. The correlation between
cyclical components in GDP and population estimated with the usual Hodrick-
Prescott filter is also essentially zero.
14Although changes in the growth trend in the employment rate have not
exerted much influence on trend employment growth, the natural rate of unem-
ployment generally trended up through the mid-1980s and then trended down.
Demographics such as the rising and then declining share of young workers
played a key role in the natural rate trends (see, for example, Shimer (1998) and
Katz and Krueger). Some have suggested a rising incarceration rate has con-
tributed to the trend reduction in unemployment since the mid-1980s (Katz and
Krueger). Rising incarceration could also have slightly boosted the trend rate of
labor force participation.
15The BLS projects average payroll growth of 1.3 percent per year from 2004
to 2014 (Su). The Council of Economic Advisers forecasts average payroll growth
of 1.2 percent from 2005 to 2011. Macroeconomic Advisers forecasts average
payroll growth of 1.0 percent from 2005 to 2014. Hotchkiss (2004) estimates the
current trend growth rate of employment to be a bit lower, at a rate correspon-
ding to about 98,000 jobs per month.
16An alternative approach would be to use just historical data and time series
models for population, labor force participation, and unemployment to forecast
long-term average growth. However, such a simple and purely statistical approach
would make it difficult to incorporate the currently available information on
demographic forces that are likely to affect growth over the next decade.
17As noted by Shapiro and Wilcox in the context of estimation of bias in CPI
inflation (an estimate also based on summing estimates of more detailed compo-
nents), the confidence interval for trend employment growth cannot be calcu-
lated by simply summing the intervals for population, labor force participation,
and the employment rate. The confidence interval is determined by the standard
deviation of the forecast error. The standard deviation of some variable z = x + y
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is always smaller than the sum of the standard deviations of x and y (even though
the variance of z equals the sum of the variances of x and y, if the covariance
between x and y is 0).
18Following the conventions of Census Bureau projections, population in
this article refers to the “resident population” of the 50 states and the District of
Columbia. Immigration refers to net international migration, defined as the
number of people moving into the 50 states and District of Columbia less the
number who moved out. Immigrants from Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Vir-
gin Islands, who are U.S. citizens, are not distinguished from immigrants from
elsewhere in the world.
19Annual immigration can be estimated two ways. The Census Bureau
decomposes net international migration into subcategories such as legal immi-
grants, net temporary nonimmigrants, and emigrants, and estimates each compo-
nent using various sources of administrative records and surveys (sources include
the BLS’s Current Population Survey, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,
and Office of Refugee Settlement). Immigration estimates obtained from this
approach can differ from estimates based on counts of the foreign-born popula-
tion provided in decennial censuses. Some other sources estimate annual immi-
gration from survey information. Data from the Current Population Survey and
American Community Survey on nativity and year of entry into the United States
can be used to estimate the number of new arrivals to the United States and the
change in the foreign-born population over a given period. Of course, the surveys
cover not the entire population but samples, creating the potential for sampling
error. In addition, the number of new arrivals represents only one of the compo-
nents of net immigration. Overall, the available estimates of annual immigration
are more indicative of broad trends than the level of net immigration in a partic-
ular year.
20Assessing recent trends in immigration and the implications for future
immigration has been further complicated by the slowdown in immigration that
followed the September 2001 terrorist attacks. Some of the slowdown is attribut-
able to increased enforcement efforts by the Department of Homeland Security,
and therefore likely permanent. But how much is uncertain.
21This Census Bureau forecast is the so-called middle series projection. Cen-
sus Bureau data on actual 2004 immigration, published in August 2005, put
immigration well above the level incorporated in the projection, which was pub-
lished in March 2004. The Bureau estimates actual 2004 immigration of about
1.2 million, compared to the projection of  950,000. 
22The Act gave permanent resident status to many illegal immigrants already
in the United States. Over time, these new permanent residents were able to
bring relatives to the United States as legal immigrants (Hollmann, Mulder, and
Kallan).
23Similarly, projections from the United Nations put annual immigration
from 2005 to 2015 at about 1.1 million persons per year (United Nations).
24Some of the forecasts, such as those from BLS and Macroeconomic Advis-
ers, are simply Census Bureau projections, with slight adjustments for updated
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25In calculating the population growth rates associated with each immigra-
tion assumption, immigration of working-age persons was assumed to be about
80 percent of total immigration, in line with recent patterns.
26The upper bound is also meant to reflect other evidence that suggests annual
immigration of 1.5 million persons per year. For example, Lee, Miller, and Ander-
son forecast annual immigration of roughly 1 million persons per year over the next
decade, with a 95 percent confidence interval of 800,000 to roughly 1.5 million.
27In light of historical errors in BLS forecasts of population growth (based on
Census Bureau forecasts), this range could be too tight. In BLS forecasts of aver-
age population growth roughly ten years ahead (reported in Fullerton 1982,
1988, 1992, 1997, 2003), the root mean square error was about 0.35, implying a
70 percent confidence interval with width of about 0.7 percentage point. How-
ever, errors in forecasts for more recent periods have been considerably smaller, in
part because forecasts of immigration have improved (Mulder). The 0.9 to 1.1
percent range used in this article is in line with the low-high range considered in
the SSA Trustees Report.
28Under an alternative decomposition, the participation rate in the first term
would be the rate in the end period rather than the initial period, and the popu-
lation weight in the second term would be the initial share rather than the end
period share. Using available projections of 2015 participation rates with this
decomposition yields broadly comparable aging effects.
29Most participation rate forecasts (for example, the BLS, CBO, and SSA
Trustee Report forecasts) use cohort analysis in projecting the participation rates
of demographic groups. For example, the fact that participation of women aged
25 to 54 is higher today than it was historically suggests that, in the future, par-
ticipation of women aged 55 to 64 will be higher than it was historically. Incor-
porating such cohort effects is generally thought to improve forecast accuracy. 
30Because the age-gender distribution of new immigrants will likely differ
somewhat from the age-gender distribution for current residents, immigration
will have some impact on overall population shares in 2015. However, the size of
the new immigrant population compared to the existing population (the stock)
will be small (even though immigration is a large component of total population
growth, the flow). Thus, the effect of immigration on total population shares will
be small.
31The 2005 population weights used in this calculation are taken from the
CBO’s population projections.
32Other, less formal analysis also puts the full employment rate at about the
actual 2005 rate of 66.0 percent (Koropeckyj; Moskow).
33This CBO figure for 2015 does not incorporate the CBO’s estimate of the
effects of tax changes on labor force participation rates. The CBO projects that
the expiration of various tax provisions in 2010-11 will lower the overall partici-
pation rate by 0.4 percentage point.
34The BLS forecast used in the 2015 average is actually for 2014. However, if
a BLS forecast for 2015 were available and used, it would likely be sufficiently
similar to the 2014 estimate as to have little effect on the average forecast. More-
over, actual participation in 2005 (66.0 percent) came in well below the SSA
Trustees Report’s forecast (66.6 percent), likely put together (the report was pub-
lished in March 2005) before any 2005 data were available. Therefore, it could be
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argued that the SSA forecast for 2015 used in forming the baseline estimate is too
high. However, a crude adjustment of lowering the SSA forecast for 2015 by 0.6
percentage point has little effect on the reported results for the trend growth of
labor force participation and employment.
35The 2.4 percentage point spread reflected in the 2015 confidence interval is
somewhat smaller than historical errors in BLS forecasts of labor force participa-
tion rates imply it should be. In BLS forecasts of participation roughly ten years
ahead (reported in Fullerton 1982, 1988, 1992, 1997, 2003), the root mean
square error was about 1.7, implying a 70 percent confidence interval with width
of about 3.4 percentage points. The smaller, subjective interval used in this article
could be justified by improvements in forecast methods.
36The baseline estimate and range for the growth rate are calculated using sim-
ulations of distributions for the participation rates in 2005 and 2015. The baseline
estimate corresponds to the median of the simulated distribution of the growth
rate. In these simulations, the full employment participation rates in 2005 and
2015 are assumed to have a correlation of about 0.5. The correlation means that
having a trend participation rate in 2005 above the baseline estimate would tend
to be associated with a trend participation rate in 2015 above the baseline forecast.
37The width of the 2005 natural rate confidence interval is broadly consistent
with Orphanides and Williams’ results on uncertainty in contemporaneous esti-
mates of the natural rate. Orphanides and Williams estimate the difference
between real time and retrospective natural rate estimates to be between 0.5 and
0.75 percentage point. A root mean square error of 0.5 percentage point implies
a 70 percent confidence interval spanning about 1.0 percentage points.
38The 1.6 percentage point spread in the confidence interval for the 2015
natural rate appears to be consistent with the size of historical errors in long-term
forecasts of the natural rate from Blue Chip (using Blue Chip’s long-horizon
unemployment rate forecasts as natural rates) and the CBO (using Kozicki’s data
on the CBO’s real-time estimates of the natural rate).
39The baseline estimate and range for the growth rate are calculated using
simulations of distributions for the natural unemployment rates in 2005 and
2015. The baseline estimate corresponds to the median of the simulated distribu-
tion of the growth rate. In these simulations, the natural rates in 2005 and 2015
are assumed to have a correlation of about 0.5. The correlation means that having
a natural rate in 2005 above the baseline estimate would tend to be associated
with a natural rate in 2015 above the baseline forecast.
40The 0.5 percentage point spread reflected in the employment growth fore-
cast is broadly in line with historical errors in BLS forecasts of employment. In
BLS forecasts of employment (usually a measure somewhat broader than payroll
employment) roughly ten years ahead, the root mean square error was about
0.35, implying a 70 percent confidence interval with width of about 0.7 percent-
age point. The smaller, subjective interval used in this article could be justified by
improvements in forecast methods.
41The change in the foreign-born population between two periods equals the
number of newly arrived immigrants less departures and (beginning-of-period)
deaths of foreign-born U.S. residents. Net international migration equals newly
arrived immigrants less emigrants who were foreign-born U.S. residents. Thus,
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net migration during a specified period is the sum of change in the foreign-born
population and deaths of those foreign-born counted at the beginning of the
period.
42Estimates of the number of illegal aliens are usually derived by subtracting
the (estimated) number of legal aliens from the total foreign-born population.
43Legal immigrants are those granted legal permanent residence. Legal non-
immigrants consist mostly of students and temporary workers, and their depend-
ents, and they are allowed to live in the United States for specified periods of time
for specific purposes associated with the types of visas they have. Illegal immi-
grants come to the United States by crossing the border illegally, or legal nonim-
migrants may become illegal immigrants if they stay in the United States after
their visas expire.
44Until 2000, the Census Bureau assumed a constant migration flow in this
category in estimating annual net migration. However, a change in immigration
law increasing the number of specialty workers granted H-1B visas during 1998-
2003 forced the Census Bureau to change this assumption (Mulder). To improve
estimates of net migration in the face of a rising number of foreign students in
the United States, the Census Bureau is considering separate estimation of foreign
students to be incorporated in the population estimates (Mulder).
 82 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
REFERENCES
Andrews, Donald W.K. 1993. “Tests for Parameter Instability and Structural
Change with Unknown Change Point,” Econometrica, July.
Bai, Jushan, and Pierre Perron. 1998. “Estimating and Testing Linear Models with
Multiple Structural Changes,” Econometrica, January.
Blanchard, Olivier, and John Simon. 2001. “The Long and Large Decline in U.S.
Output Volatility,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no 1.
Blue Chip Economic Indicators. 2005. October 10.
Bradbury, Katherine. 2005. “Additional Slack in the Economy:  The Poor
Recovery in Labor Force Participation During This Business Cycle,” Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston, Public Policy Brief No. 05-2.
Bradbury, Katherine, and Jane Katz. 2005. “Women’s Rise—A Work in Progress:
Are Professional Women Opting Out? Recent Evidence on College-Educated
Women's Labor Force Participation,” Federal Reserve Bank of Boston,
Regional Review, First Quarter.
Clemen, Robert T. 1989. “Combining Forecasts:  A Review and Annotated
Bibliography,” International Journal of Forecasting, December. 
Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Congress. 2006. “The Budget and Economic
Outlook: Fiscal Years 2007 to 2016,” January.
__________. 2004. “CBO’s Projections of the Labor Force,” September.
Costa, Dora. 1998. The Evolution of Retirement: An American Economic History,
1880-1990. Chicago:  University of Chicago Press.
Costanzo, Joseph M., Cynthia Davis, Caribert Irazi, Daniel Goodkind, and
Roberto Ramirez. 2002. “Evaluating Components of International
Migration:  The Residual Foreign Born,” U.S. Census Bureau, Population
Division Working Paper no. 61, June. 
Council of Economic Advisers. 2005. “Joint Press Release of the Council of
Economic Advisers, Department of the Treasury, and Office of Management
and Budget,” December 1, www.whitehouse.gov/cea/pr12012005.html.
Ferguson, Roger W., Jr. 2005. “Interpreting Labor Market Statistics in the Context
of Monetary Policy,” speech at the Andrew Brimmer Policy Forum on
National Economic and Financial Policies for Growth, Employment, and the
Improvement of Equity, Annual Convention, Allied Social Science
Associations, Philadelphia, January 7.
Filardo, Andrew J. 1995. “Has the Productivity Trend Steepened in the 1990s?”
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Economic Review, Fourth Quarter.
Fullerton, Howard N., Jr. 2003. “Evaluating the BLS Labor Force Projections to
2000,” Monthly Labor Review, October.
__________. 1997. “Evaluating the 1995 Labor Force Projections,” Monthly
Labor Review, September.
__________. 1992. “Evaluation of Labor Force Projections to 1990,” Monthly
Labor Review, August.
__________. 1988. “An Evaluation of Labor Force Projections to 1985,” Monthly
Labor Review, November.
__________. 1982. “How Accurate Were Projections of the 1980 Labor Force?”
Monthly Labor Review, July.
 ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2006 83
Himmelberg, Charles, and Margaret M. McConnell. 2006. “How Much Labor
Market Slack:  The Importance of Adjusting for Trend Participation Rates,”
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, manuscript.
Hodrick, Robert, and Edward S. Prescott. 1997. “Postwar U.S. Business Cycles:
An Empirical Investigation,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, February. 
Hollmann, Frederick W., Tammany J. Mulder, and Jeffrey E. Kallan. 2000.
“Methodology and Assumptions for the Population Projections of the United
States:  1999 to 2100,” U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division Working
Paper no. 38, January.
Hotchkiss, Julie L. 2005. “What’s Up with the Decline in Female Labor Force
Participation?” Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper no. 2005-18,
August.
__________. 2004. “Employment Growth and Labor Force Participation:  How
Many Jobs Are Enough?” Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper
no. 2004-25, October.
Johnson, Richard. 2002. “The Puzzle of Later Male Retirement,” Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City, Economic Review, Third Quarter.
Kahn, George A. 1993. “Sluggish Job Growth:  Is Rising Productivity Or an
Anemic Recovery to Blame?” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Economic
Review, Third Quarter.
Katz, Lawrence F., and Alan B. Krueger. 1999. “The High-Pressure Labor Market
of the 1990s,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 1.
Kim, Chang-Jin, and Charles Nelson. 1999. “Has the U.S. Economy Become
More Stable? A Bayesian Approach Based on a Markov-Switching Model of
the Business Cycle,” Review of Economics and Statistics, November.
Koropeckyj, Sophia. 2004. “Labor Force Participation Revisited,” Dismal
Scientist,  December 6, www.economy.com/dismal/pro/article.asp?cid=10497. 
Kozicki, Sharon. 2004. “How Do Data Revisions Affect the Evaluation and
Conduct of Monetary Policy?”  Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City,
Economic Review, First Quarter.
Lebow, David E., and Jeremy B. Rudd. 2003. “Measurement Error in the
Consumer Price Index:  Where Do We Stand?”  Journal of Economic
Literature, March.
Lee, Ronald, Timothy Miller, and Michael Anderson. 2004. “Stochastic Infinite
Horizon Forecasts for Social Security and Related Studies,” NBER Working
Paper no. 10917, November.
Macroeconomic Advisers. 2006. Long-Term Economic Outlook, January.
McConnell, Margaret M., and Gabriel Perez-Quiros. 2000. “Output Fluctuations
in the United States:  What Has Changed Since the Early 1980s?” American
Economic Review, December.
Mise, Emi, Tae-Hwan Kim, and Paul Newbold. 2005. “On Suboptimality of the
Hodrick–Prescott Filter at Time Series Endpoints,” Journal of
Macroeconomics, March.
Moskow, Michael E. 2005. “U.S. Economic Outlook,” speech at the Market News
International Lecture Series, New York, November 21.
Mulder, Tammany. 2001. “Accuracy of the U.S. Census Bureau National
Population Projections and Their Respective Components of Change,” U.S.
Census Bureau, manuscript.
 84 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Mulder, Tammany J., Fredrick W. Hollmann, Lisa R. Lollock, Rachel C. Cassidy,
Joseph M. Costanzo, and Josephine D. Baker. 2001. “U.S. Census Bureau
Measurement of Net International Migration to the United States:  1990 to
2000,” U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division Working Paper no. 51,
December.
Orphanides, Athanasios. 2003. “The Quest for Prosperity Without Inflation,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, April.
Orphanides, Athanasios, and John C. Williams. 2002. “Robust Monetary Policy
Rules with Unknown Natural Rates,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,
no. 2.
Otoo, Maria Ward. 1999. “Temporary Employment and the Natural Rate of
Unemployment,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FEDS
Working Paper 1999-66, July.
Passel, Jeffrey S. 2005. “Estimates of the Size and Characteristics of the
Undocumented Population,” Pew Hispanic Center Report, March.
Passel, Jeffrey S., and Roberto Suro. 2005. “Rise, Peak, and Decline: Trends in
U.S. Immigration 1992-2004,” Pew Hispanic Center Report, September.
Perron, Pierre, and Tatsuma Wada. 2005. “Let's Take a Break: Trends and Cycles
in U.S. Real GDP,” Boston University, manuscript.
Perry, George L. 1971. “Labor Force Structure, Potential Output, and
Productivity,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 3.
Quinn, Joseph F. 1999. “Has the Early Retirement Trend Reversed?” Boston
College Working Paper no. 424.
Rotemberg, Julio J. 1999. “A Method for Decomposing Time Series into Trend
and Cycle Components,” NBER Working Paper no. 7439, December.
Schreft, Stacey L., and Aarti Singh. 2003. “A Closer Look at Jobless Recoveries,”
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Economic Review, Second Quarter.
Shapiro, Matthew D., and David W. Wilcox. 1996. “Mismeasurement in the
Consumer Price Index:  An Evaluation,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual.
Shimer, Robert. 2005. “The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment
and Vacancies,” American Economic Review, March.
__________. 1998. “Why Is the U.S. Unemployment Rate So Much Lower?”
NBER Macroeconomics Annual.
Staiger, Douglas, James H. Stock, and Mark W. Watson. 1997. “The NAIRU,
Unemployment and Monetary Policy,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Winter. 
Stock, James H., and Mark W. Watson. 2002. “Has the Business Cycle Changed
and Why?” NBER Macroeconomics Annual.
__________. 1998. “Median Unbiased Estimation of Coefficient Variance in a
Time-Varying Parameter Model,” Journal of the American Statistical
Association, March.
Su, Betty W. 2005. “The U.S. Economy to 2014,” Monthly Labor Review,
November.
Survey of Professional Forecasters. 2005. Third Quarter.
Technical Panel on Assumptions and Methods. 2003. Report to the Social Security
Advisory Board, Washington, October.
Timmermann, Allan. 2006. “Forecast Combinations,” in Graham Elliott, Clive
W.J. Granger, and Allan Timmermann, eds., Handbook of Economic
Forecasting. North Holland (forthcoming).
 ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2006 85
Toosi, Mitra. 2005. “Labor Force Projections to 2014:  Retiring Boomers,”
Monthly Labor Review, November.
United Nations. 2004. World Population Prospects:  The 2004 Revision,
http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp?panel=2. 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2005(a). “Aggregate Economy (Critical
Variables),” December, ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/ep/macro.model/
empmacagg99.txt.
__________. 2005(b). “Employment from the BLS Household and Payroll
Surveys: Summary of Recent Trends,” December, www.bls.gov/web/ces_cps_
trends.pdf. 
U.S. Census Bureau. 2005. “Population, Population Change, and Estimated
Components of Population Change:  April 1st, 2000 to July 1st, 2005,”
www.census.gov/popest/states/tables/NST-EST2005-04.xls. 
__________. 2004. “Interim Projections of the U.S. Population by Age, Sex,
Race, and Hispanic Origin,” March, www.census.gov/ipc/www/usinterimproj/.
U.S. Social Security Administration. 2005. 2005 Annual Report of the Board of
Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance
Trust Funds, U.S. Government Printing Office, April.
Warren, Robert. 2003. “Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population
Residing in the United States:  1990 to 2000,” Office of Policy and Planning,
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, January.
Weiner, Stuart. 1993. “New Estimates of the Natural Rate of Unemployment,”
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Economic Review, Fourth Quarter.
 